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Daniel Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 
 
 
Daniel Bell’s newest book continues the line of research he began more than twenty years 
ago, when he called for greater attention to the normative implications of Chinese approaches 
to politics. Unlike his earlier work, however, Bell does not here promote particular readings 
of the Chinese tradition in order to defend more communitarian approaches to public life.  
Although such readings remain clear undercurrents in The China Model, Bell focuses more 
on the contemporary practices of the Chinese party leadership to defend their model of 
meritocracy as a credible (albeit qualified) alternative to democracy, particularly for Chinese 
heritage societies but also possibly for the rest of the world. Bell’s larger goal is to undermine 
unquestioned faith in democracy as the only normatively defensible political model. In many 
ways Bell’s approach is refreshing because it is too little seen among Anglophone political 
theorists: he takes a non-Western, non-democratic political model seriously enough to draw 
out its normative and institutional implications within broader debates about good 
governance. For the most part he successfully avoids reductive essentialisms about East 
Asian culture by considering how the “China model” of centralized meritocracy, once 
suitably integrated with local democratic mechanisms, might produce a legitimate alternative 
to electoral democracy.  
 
Unfortunately, his argument is unlikely to convince anyone already committed to democracy, 
for at least two reasons. First, the evidence for the problems with “democracy” that Bell 
offers seem more precisely attributable to specific aspects of the contemporary American 
two-party political system than to democratic government itself. Bell defines democracy 
somewhat simplistically throughout his book as “one person, one vote,” (14 et passim) and 
draws examples almost exclusively from the United States (20). Despite this focus, his 
sweeping critique of democracy conflates differences both between federal, state, and 
township election systems in the United States, even as his meritocratic proposal insists on 
differentiating federal from local practices in the Chinese case (171). He also gives no 
account of alternative institutions, despite the fact that he draws on attempts to reform the 
British House of Lords (one example of how popular power is distributed and checked 
differently in different democratic systems) as evidence of the sacred power held by “one 
person one vote” (161).  Finally, he offers no sustained discussion of why the well-known 
problems of American-style electoral democracy—such as tyranny of the majority—are 
better solved with meritocracy specifically, rather than more or different kinds of democracy, 
including deliberative practices at the local and national levels or proportional representation 
to replace American two-party electoral democracy.  
 
Second, and more importantly, many of these criticisms of democracy—and by extension, 
Bell’s defense of meritocracy—turn on a problematic conception of knowledge as a body of 
always-expanding but nevertheless fairly objective information. Meritocracy is thus defined 
as a system that can somehow effectively determine, and ensconce with power, those few 
rational individuals who properly grasp that knowledge. If we accept this conception of 
knowledge, Bell’s claim that “voters should do their best to select wise leaders” would 
indeed be as uncontroversial as he assumes (19), as would the meritocratic conclusions 
stemming from the observation that “not everyone is equally able and willing to vote in a 
sensible manner” (156)—for which Bell cites John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on 
Representative Government.  Bell interprets resistance to such conclusions as political, not 
philosophical: that is, they make rational sense but they are politically infeasible because no 
one these days would willingly accept disenfranchisement (156, 159).   
 
This unironic use of Mill, paired with Bell’s continued insistence that popular participation is 
necessary only as a practical measure to secure “democratic legitimacy” to a regime 
otherwise ruled by meritocrats (151), elides not only the justification of colonialism implied 
in Mill’s remarks about “distinctions and gradations” in knowledge (156), but also the 
alternative views that emerged in critical response to just such a colonial, androcentric 
discourse of knowledge that registered difference as inferiority or deficiency. To his credit, 
Bell acknowledges (again citing Mill) “new sources of merit” and “differentiated standards of 
merit” (134-5) that may emerge in response to new circumstances, but these are not 
integrated with his recognition of the need to include persons of different genders and socio-
economic background into meritocratic processes. For Bell, this inclusion simply addresses 
the possibility that “politicians are more likely to fight for the interests of people from their 
own background when faced with competing considerations” (129). However, for most 
feminists and multiculturalists, these inclusions are necessary precisely because knowledge 
itself—particularly political knowledge—is not a body of objective information that can be 
assessed by and for experts, but rather a contested field of claims to truth that implicitly 
privilege certain groups over others. One reason to support (a version of) democracy, then, 
may be to resist the elevation of any one criteria of knowledge—as well as, of course, the 
group of people that body of knowledge implicitly privileges—to a status beyond meaningful 
political critique.  That is, contrary to Bell’s assumptions, democracy may not be a failed 
system for choosing “superior” political leaders (9), but rather a system that encourages 
interrogation of the very idea of superiority in politics. 
 
Without addressing this more subtle relationship between power and knowledge, Bell’s 
argument will not convince many contemporary scholars of politics. Nor would it necessarily 
be compelling to the historical Chinese thinkers that Bell occasionally cites in support of his 
claims: thinkers such as Zhu Xi and Su Shi did subscribe to a unitary view of moral and 
political knowledge, but they were emphatic that access to such knowledge remained 
irreducibly personal and differentiated. To them, one’s conversance with it could never be 
adequately assessed by any kind of objective selection or examination system.  Although 
Bell’s book does devote much-needed attention to an otherwise overlooked alternative to 
democracy, his broader thesis is overshadowed by these evidential shortcomings. 
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